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Foreign aid, after years of disregard, is back in business. At the W orld Economic Forum in Davos,
important policy sessions were eclipsed by B-grade actors indulging in aid-hugging histrionics.
Then, Jacques Chirac tried to out-compete Tony Blair for acclaim as the true aid enthusiast by
calling for a $10 billion annual fund to fight AIDS (a trifle cynically, I must add, because the
principal financing  proposed was the imposition of a Tobin tax on capital flows, an idea that is
now defunct except among fringe groups). Separately, the tsunami relief pledges turned quickly
into an international contest where different donors were keen to outbid one another. And most
recently, Mr. Blair’s Africa Commission has recommended a substantial stepping up of aid to that
continent, marked by regress and crying out for support. 
But even as aid proponents now ask for each OECD country to spend 0.7% of GNP on foreign
aid, and for the bulk of it to be spent in Africa, there are many skeptics who argue that these
targets are overambitious. These are not indifferent folk, morally defective; they include
developmental economists familiar with the history of aid and Africanists with experience of the
continent. Their worry is that the absorptive capacity in many of the countries where the
substantially increased aid funds will be spent is limited. Yes, we can certainly increase aid flows,
as the Blair Commission persuasively argues; but the question is whether we should raise them
so widely, so quickly and so high. 
The skeptics fear that greatly expanded aid will result mainly in waste. In fact, worse may happen:
sharply accelerated aid may even become counterproductive, leading to actual harm. For those
who believe in the “oil curse,” i.e. that sudden increases in wealth wind up hurting a country
through profligacy and corruption, it seems probable that corruption will overwhelm the aid
recipients. Call it the “aid curse.”
 It is often suggested that plurilateral monitoring within Africa, to which nearly 25 countries have
agreed as part of an African Peer Review Mechanism, will mitigate such outcomes. But that
seems too optimistic when one sees, say, the inability of South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki to
condemn his counterpart in Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe; or the predictable difficulty that Nigeria,
despite the remarkable leadership of President Obasanjo, faces in rooting out long-festering
corruption. A danger is that the support for even modest aid could disappear as much larger sums
are squandered, undermining the credibility of foreign aid as a policy.
Yet there is a paradox here: If we were to think of aid, more appropriately, as funds spent not just
in Africa but for Africa, big donor targets such 0.7% of GNP might come to be seen as
insufficiently ambitious. For while there are limits to what we can spend directly in Africa for Africa,
the ability to spend money productively outside Africa for Africa is far greater—and if aid spending
is re-conceptualised and implemented in this way, the 0.7% target could seem a paltry cop-out.
In practice, aid flows have reflected two principles: first, that aid must be a moral obligation which
takes the form of a commitment commensurate with a donor’s resources; and second, that the
resulting flows must be used efficiently. W hen the aid is simply to provide consumption, as in a
famine or flood, the requirement of efficient use is easier to fulfil than when investments are to be
undertaken—though in some countries even the ability to distribute food and medical supplies has
been hobbled by lack of local infrastructure and reasonable governance. 
Aid has a long pedigree as a moral obligation. Just as the Catholic church collected a tithe at 10%
of one’s income, and the zakat in Islam took 2.5%, the aid community has always gravitated to
targets for donors. The original target, 1% of GNP, was the idea of Sir Arthur Lewis, the economist
who was adviser to Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the British Labour Party, who wanted a target for his
party’s political platform in the 1950s.
Meanwhile, many over the years have called for much larger aid flows than even 1% of GNP to
address world poverty, among them the Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov, who proposed a “tax
on the developed countries equal to 20% of the national income”! In practice, however, even the
1% target was quickly reduced to 0.7% for official aid and 0.3% for private capital flows—providing
comfort to the donors but violating commonsense, because aid, an unrequited flow of assistance,
should not be confused with a mutual-gain commercial transaction such as private capital flows. 
But if the targets have always posed a problem, so has a key, related question: How is aid to be
translated into political obligation? Of course, if the aid flows are wasted, it will be impossible to
sell them politically. But even if absorptive capacities are assured, it has always been a problem to
get politicians in rich nations to accept an aid commitment. 
W hen Gunnar Myrdal and the pioneering development economist Paul Rosenstein-Rodan
proposed in the 1950s that aid be given out of altruistic motives, this was considered to be pie in
the sky. Ever since, the more practical aid proponents have sold aid as being in the enlightened
self-interest of the donors. The Cold W ar helped for many years: If we did not assist poor nations,
the argument went, the Soviets would take over. But aid proponents also turned to other, less
compelling arguments. The Brandt Commission argued that aid spending would promote
employment, ignoring the fact that there was no Keynesian unemployment at the time and failing
to confront the obvious retort that domestic spending would do this even better, and at lower cost.
No wonder the Commission was ignored.
 Then, in the U.S., the case was made that if we did not help Mexico, “peso refugees” would
stream in, ignoring the fact that a slight improvement in Mexican prosperity would only finance
more attempted entries across the Rio Grande. The most recent bad argument for aid invokes the
war against terror, in spite of compelling evidence that terrorists are not afflicted by poverty and
illiteracy but come typically from the educated middle class.
Moral obligation is easy for cosmopolitan elites to assert. But it will simply not work if there is no
strong empathy that bonds nations or communities across borders. Adam Smith, writing over two
centuries ago, put the matter beautifully when he asked how “a man of humanity in Europe” would
react to disaster in China:  “If he was to lose his little finger tomorrow, he would not sleep to-night;
but provided he never saw them, he would snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a
hundred million of his brethren [abroad].”
But today, thanks to the Internet and the revolution in communications, pestilence and famine
abroad are constantly before us; we no longer can snore our way through them. W itness our
reaction to the recent South Asian tsunami. Finally, aid proponents sense there is Spring in the
air, and that the political and ethical conditions are optimal for a leap forward into big aid. Yet
unless the anxiety over absorptive capacity is resolved, we cannot capitalize on this changed
sentiment. And that is where the conventional focus on aid—as only what is spent in recipient
countries (rather than for them altogether)—needs now to be abandoned. The phrase “foreign aid”
encourages this notion; it is time to revert to the older phrase, “development assistance.” 
Much could be done for Africa abroad. Consider, for instance, the development of vaccines and
cures for yellow fever, malaria and other diseases. Just as the British established the Institute for
Tropical Medicine, the same approach could absorb with efficacy far more substantial public
moneys today to win the war on disease in Africa.
One could compensate cotton producers who are opposing the removal of U.S. subsidies that
undermine the exports of the four cotton-exporting African nations. Innovative research for African
crops could be financed on an ample scale, with the same results as the Norman Borlaug-inspired
Green Revolution in certain developing countries in the 1960s. A Gray Peace Corps could be
established that deploys the senior citizens in our ageing society to spend periods in Africa, where
they would alleviate the enormous shortages of skills that cripple African development. The
possibilities are limitless. 
The certain consequence of this rethink on development assistance would be that a target of 0.7%
of GNP, which the “big aid” proponents seem to embrace, is not ambitious enough. W ith empathy
for development now strong, and with our ability to devise and implement programs at home that
would assist the poor nations, we should aim higher. Let us return to the original target of 1% of
GNP—for a start. And above all, let us spend it right.
